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CRIMINAL LAW-GRAND JURIES,
EXEMPLARS AND PROSECUTORS
On the basis of recordings, which had been intercepted by government
agents with court authorization,' a special grand jury, convened in the
Northern District of Illinois in February, 1971 to investigate possible vio-
lations of federal criminal statutes relating to gambling, 2 subpoenaed 20
persons, including Antonio Dionisio and Charles Bishop Smith, for the sole
purpose of procuring from them voice exemplars. The subpoenas were
issued, at the instigation of the United States Attorney, in order to iden-
tify the voices on the recordings. 3  All of the persons subpoenaed were
informed that they were "potential defendants" and refused, before the
grand jury, to furnish the exemplars. They were subsequently brought
before District Judge Edwin A. Robson and, upon another refusal, were
held in contempt of court and sentenced to be confined for 18 months,
or the duration of the grand jury, without bail.4 The Court of Appeals for
1. The court orders were issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (Supp. V
1970), which requires a judicial determination of four findings, three being find-
ings of probable cause. One of these three is of special interest here, i.e., that
"there is probable cause to believe that an individual is committing . . . a
particular offense enumerated in section 2516 of this chapter ....... (Emphasis
added) (Section 2516(c) includes the transmission of wagering information). As-
suming that the wiretap was conducted within the court order, pursuant to § 2518,
a question arises as to the defendants' position in this wiretap situation. For if
Dionisio, Smith or any of the 18 others had been the "individual" suspected of
committing crime, there would have been no need for such a large number of per-
sons being subpoenaed for exemplars.
2. Dionisio and Smith were, at no time, informed specifically which statutes
were suspected of having been violated. However, on August 10, 1971, Smith was
indicted on fifteen counts of having violated 18 U.S.C. §§ 1952, 1954 (1971).
Due to this indictment, the Supreme Court did not grant certiorari in Smith's case.
Smith was indicted without the benefit of the voice exemplars for which purpose
he had been subpoenaed. Brief for Respondent, Charles Bishop Smith, in Opposi-
tion at 1-2, No. 71-229 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1971). Thus the information necessary to
indict must have come from another source. In subsequent proceedings, the dis-
trict court granted a motion to suppress the intercepted communications, which
were the basis for the subpoenaes, in United States v. Charles Bishop Smith, No.
70 CR 852 (N.D. Ill. March 7, 1972) (unreported), which order is now on appeal
before the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. United States v. Smith,
No. 72-1637 (7th Cir. 1972). Brief for Respondent at 2, United States v. Dion-
isio, 410 U.S. (1973).
3. Brief for Respondent at 2, United States v. Dionisio, 93 S. Ct. 764 (1973).
4. Appendix to Brief for Appellant at 8-18, United States v. Dionisio, 93 S. Ct.
764 (1973).
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the Seventh Circuit reversed the contempt convictions, as violative of the
appellants' fourth amendment rights, on the grounds that the Government
had not made a showing of reasonableness in having requested the exem-
plars.5 The court affirmed, however, the district court's rejection of the
appellants' fifth and sixth amendment claims.6 The Government petitioned
for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, arguing that
the court of appeals had greatly expanded fourth amendment protections
before the grand jury and that there was a conflict in the circuits. 7 The
petition was granted on May 30, 1972.
In a companion case, United States v. Maras Richard J. Mara 9 had
been subpoenaed before the September, 1971 Grand Jury in the North-
ern District of Illinois, which was investigating thefts in interstate com-
merce. Mr. Mara was also informed that he was a "potential defend-
ant" and was asked to furnish handwriting exemplars for the purpose
of comparing them with certain writings. 10 When Mara refused, the Gov-
ernment requested that the district court compel him to do so, accom-
panying that request, on the basis of the Dionisio decision by the court
of appeals, with an FBI" affidavit, submitted in camera, which purport-
edly set forth the reasons for seeking the exemplars.1 2  The district court
held Mara in contempt when he again refused, before the court, to sub-
mit the exemplars, claiming fourth, fifth and sixth amendment protec-
tions. The court of appeals affirmed the denial of the fifth and sixth
amendment claims, but reversed, as in Dionisio, on the basis of the
5. In re Dionisio, 442 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1971).
6. Id. at 278.
7. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, United States v. Dionisio, 93 S. Ct. 764
(1973). The main case in conflict was United States v. Doe (Schwartz), 457
F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1972), stay granted, Schwartz v. United States, 406 U.S. 955
(1972). See infra note 56.
8. 93 S. Ct. 774 (1973).
9. aka Richard J. Marasovich.
10. According to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, none of these
writings had been the fruit of grand jury investigations, but rather were "the re-
sults the Government derived from its own investigation and then presented to
the grand jury." Mara v. United States, 454 F.2d 580, 583 (7th Cir. 1971).
11. Federal Bureau of Investigation (hereinafter referred to as the FBI).
12. Neither Mara nor his attorney were ever allowed to inspect this affidavit,
although apparently it was transmitted to both the court of appeals (supra note
10) and to the Supreme Court (Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 7, n.2, United
States v. Mara, 93 S. Ct. 774 (1973)) for their reviews of the case. Perhaps more
interesting is the fact that nowhere, in either the briefs or the opinions involved in
the case is there any mention of the grand jury having had an opportunity to in-
spect the affidavit.
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fourth amendment claim. 13 The court elaborated on the requirements of
a showing of reasonableness. 1 4 The Government petitioned for a writ of
certiorari in the Mara case, arguing that the court had expanded fourth
amendment protections even more than in the Dionisio case, which ex-
pansion conflicted with the broad investigatory powers of the grand
jury.' - The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases,' 6 rejecting
appellees' fifth amendment claims with dissents by Justices Douglas and
Marshall, their fourth amendment claims with dissents by Justices Douglas,
Marshall and Brennan, and not discussing their sixth amendment claims
at all. United States v. Dionisio, 93 S.Ct. 764 (1973); United States v.
Mara, 93 S.Ct. 774 (1973).
The Dionisio and Mara decisions were handed down on the same
day as Roe v. Wade' 7 and Doe v. Bolton,' 8 which struck down two state
abortion statutes as being violative of the right to liberty as guaranteed
by the fourteenth amendment. The essence of the latter decisions was
the upholding of a woman's right to privacy over the states' claimed inter-
ests. In the wake of these two decisions, Dionisio and Mara have hardly
been noticed. Yet their effect on the right of privacy may be more far-
reaching and significant than the two abortion decisions. In upholding
the "broad investigatory power" of the grand jury as against the indi-
vidual rights of the citizen, in deference to its "historic role as a protec-
tive bulwark standing solidly between the ordinary citizen and an over-
zealous prosecutor,"' 19 the Court continued a misunderstanding which has
long existed among legal thinkers and jurists concerning the functions of
the grand jury. It is the purpose of this note to examine the law appli-
cable to the taking of exemplars by other investigative bodies and how
the court of appeals and the Supreme Court viewed this law in their re-
13. Mara v. United States, 454 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1971).
14. "Like the reasonableness requirement applied to a grand jury subpoena to
produce documentary evidence, a reasonable direction to furnish exemplars requires
that the Government's affidavit show that the grand jury investigation was prop-
erly authorized, for a purpose Congress can order, that the information sought is
relevant to the inquiry, and that . . . the Government must affirmatively show
that the grand jury process is not being abused." Id. at 584-85. See Oklahoma
Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1945). The court also noted
at length that it would require the affidavit to be presented in an open and ad-
versary hearing and stated its reasons for such a hearing, 454 F.2d at 582-84.
15. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 5, United States v. Mara, 93 S. Ct. 774
(1973).
16. 406 U.S. 956 (1972).
17. 93 S. Ct. 755 (1973).
18. 93 S. Ct. 739 (1973).
19. United States v. Dionisio, 93 S. Ct. at 773.
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view of Dionisio and Mara; to analyze the "historic role" of the grand
jury in today's society and whether it justifies the imposition of fourth
amendment standards different than those imposed on other investi-
gative bodies; and to discuss the increased potentiality for prosecutorial
abuse which may well have been created by the Court's decisions in
Dionisio and Mara. This note will not deal extensively with the fifth
amendment claims, due to their involved nature and because they are pur-
portedly already well settled, 20 but will discuss them as they are related
to the aforementioned issues.
Although the subject matter of exemplars is not, for the most part,
entitled to fifth amendment protection when demanded by investigative
bodies, since it has been considered by the Supreme Court to be "non-testi-
monial" in nature, 21 the status of exemplars, in terms of the fourth amend-
ment, has, until recently, been in question. The Davis v. Mississippi22
case partially ended this debate. In the Davis case, two issues were de-
termined by the Court. First, the Court decided that the fourth amend-
ment applies to "investigatory detentions" just as much as to arrests. 23
Second, detentions for the sole purpose of obtaining fingerprints were
held to be subject to the fourth amendment, although, the Court said, it
may not be necessary to fully establish the normal requirement of prob-
able cause, 24 since fingerprint exemplars are essentially "reliable. '25
The problem, in Davis, was that no attempt had been made to pro-
cure judicial approval of the detentions. 26  The Court was apparently
bothered by two aspects of the case, that no judge had ever had the op-
portunity to approve or disapprove the actions taken by the police, and
20. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388
U.S. 263 (1967). But see Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion in the Dionisio
and Mara cases, 93 S. Ct. at 781-84.
21. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388
U.S. 263 (1967).
22. 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
23. Id. at 726-27.
24. "Detentions for the sole purpose of obtaining fingerprints are no less sub-
ject to the constraints of the Fourth Amendment. It is arguable, however, that,
because of the unique nature of the fingerprinting process, such detentions might,
under narrowly defined circumstances, be found to comply with the Fourth Amend-
ment even though there is no probable cause in the traditional sense." Id. at 727
(emphasis added). See also Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 942-43 (9th
Cir. 1971) which states that "[t]he public interest will be protected if grand jury
witnesses come forth to provide testimony concerning the possible commission of
crimes. The requirement that probable cause be shown [prior to the issuance of a
material witness arrest warrant] in no way adversely affects that interest."
25. 394 U.S. at 727.
26. Id. at 728.
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that the fourth amendment privileges of the detainees had, in fact,
been violated. To remedy this situation, the Court demanded that "the gen-
eral requirement that the authorization of a judicial officer be obtained
in advance of detention" be made applicable to detention for the sole
purpose of obtaining fingerprint exemplars.27
The court of appeals, in Dionisio,28 determined that the interposi-
tion of a grand jury between the detainees, that is, witnesses who are
potential defendants subpoenaed for the sole purpose of procuring voice
exemplars, and the investigators, did not sufficiently change the situa-
tion to make Davis inapplicable. The court stated that:
The fourth amendment bans "wholesale intrusions" upon personal security whether
such intrusions stem from illegal arrests or from grand jury subpoenas ostensibly
issued only because of the Government's bald statement that the witnesses are
potential defendants.2 9
The court essentially was saying that, in its investigatory role, the grand
jury is no less required to meet the requirements of the fourth amend-
ment, in either method or substance, than were the law enforcement of-
ficers in Davis.
In so holding, the Court apparently did not consider the supervisory
capacity of the district court over the subpoena power of the grand jury
to be enough of a judicial determination to satisfy fourth amendment re-
quirements. The Supreme Court, in reviewing Dionisio and Mara,3 0 de-
nied the applicability of the Davis case partially upon the ground that
there was no initial search of any constitutional consequence"' in the
Dionisio and Mara cases. The Court felt the grand jury subpoena to be
more similar to normal legal process than to the arrest in Schmerber,3 2
the investigative "stop" in Terry,3 3 or the "investigative detention" in
Davis, implying that the presence of a supervising court in the grand jury
subpoena situation makes it far less susceptible to fourth amendment
abuse than the aforementioned situations.34
27. 394 U.S. at 728.
28. In re Dionisio, 442 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1971).
29. Id. at 281.
30. United States v. Dionisio, 93 S. Ct. 764 (1973); United States v. Mara,
93 S. Ct. 774 (1973).
31. The Court noted that there are two levels which it has seen as potential sit-
uations for fourth amendment violation, as was illustrated in Schmerber v. Cal-
ifornia, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), i.e., the
initial search of the person and the subsequent search and seizure of the evidence.
32. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
33. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
34. 93 S. Ct. at 772.
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In Dionisio and Mara, as in all cases involving grand jury sub-
poenas, the subpoena power rested not with the grand jury or the pros-
ecutor, but, at least technically, in the court which convened the grand
jury. 35 Thus, it would seem, at first glance, that Davis, in which no at-
tempt to procure prior judicial approval or disapproval of the police actions
had been made, should not apply to the grand jury subpoena situation,
due to the supervision by the court in the latter case. What was really
constitutionally important to the Davis Court, however, was the absence
of any substantive judicial review and the lack of judicial opportunity to
determine whether probable cause existed for the procuring of fingerprint
samples.3 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(a) explicitly states
that "the clerk of the court shall issue a subpoena, signed and sealed
but otherwise in blank to a party requesting it, who shall then fill in the
blanks before it is served." 37  There is, then, at no time prior to defend-
ant's motion to quash, a judicial review of the grounds for the sub-
poena.38  Though the court is technically involved in the subpoena pro-
cess, the substantive effect is the same as it was in Davis, that is, "no at-
tempt was made here to employ procedures which might comply with
the requirements of the Fourth Amendment."'8 9
The lack of judicial determination of probable cause in the subpoena
situation does not mean that the fourth amendment is violated whenever
a person is compelled by subpoena to appear before the grand jury,40
35. In re National Window Glass Workers, 287 F. 219, 225 (N.D. Ohio 1922);
Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 49 (1959). Though Brown was overruled in
United States v. Harris, 382 U.S. 162 (1965), that action did not affect the prop-
osition referred to here. As to the subpoena power, see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 17.
36. See, e.g., Rech v. United States, 410 F.2d 1131, 1132 (10th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 970 (1969) which distinguished Davis from the case before
it in holding that Rech's detention, during which a photograph was taken for
identification purposes, "was pursuant to a criminal complaint made on probable
cause"; Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 660, n.1 (1971) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 761 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); Id. at 784 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Jones v. Peyton, 411 F.2d 857.
862 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, Cox, Penitentiary Superintendent v. Jones, 396
U.S. 942 (1969); United States v. Harris, 453 F.2d 1317, 1320 (8th Cir. 1972)
where the court discusses the consistency between the Davis and Schmerber deci-
sions.
37. Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(a), (emphasis added).
38. Comment, Federal Grand Jury Investigation of Political Dissidents, 7 HARV.
Civ. RIGHTS-Clv. LIB. L. REV. 432, 446 (1972). See also Note, The Grand Jury
as an Investigatory Body, 74 HARV. L. REV. 590, 593 (1961).
39. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. at 728.
40. Fraser v. United States, 452 F.2d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 1971).
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as it would, subject to certain exceptions, 41 in police detentions without
probable cause. 42  Still, it is important to note, the fourth amendment
requirements are not satisfied at the subpoena stage, by reason of the
procedures set forth in Rule 17(a), which was promulgated by the Su-
preme Court itself. By these procedures, the supervising court normally
has no opportunity to be aware of, much less review, the basis which ei-
ther the grand jury or the prosecutor believes to be present for the issuance
of the subpoenas.
Having held that the Davis principles apply in the Dionisio situation,
43
the court of appeals suggested that the standard to be met in the obtain-
ing of exemplars might be less than that of probable cause, and, as the
Supreme Court had in Davis, the court left open what the requirements of
such a lesser standard might be. 44  This situation was clarified by the
court's subsequent decision in Mara v. United States4 5 in which it enumer-
ated the requirements for a showing of reasonableness. 46  In that case,
as has been stated, the Government made an attempt to comply with
Dionisio by submitting, in camera, an affidavit to the district court sup-
posedly stating its reasons for asking the court to compel the exemplars.
The court of appeals denied the acceptability of this procedure as a ful-
fillment of the requirement for a showing of reasonableness. First, the
court required that the Government's affidavit be made in an open
and adversary context, in order that the witness may challenge the affi-
davit. The court imposed this requirement in light of the Alderman
47
and Dennis48 decisions and, additionally, noted that, in a warrant situa-
tion, the accused has an opportunity to make a motion to suppress based
on an inspection of the warrant. Here, however, the witness was sentenced
for contempt of court without any opportunity to inspect the affidavit,
the document which stated the purported reasons for initiating the entire
process. 49 The court did discuss special situations where the Government
41. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
42. See, e.g., Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961).
43. 442 F.2d at 281.
44. Id.
45. 454 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1971).
46. Supra note 14.
47. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 183-84 (1969).
48. Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 873-75 (1966).
49. 454 F.2d at 583.
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might not have to disclose its affidavit and the procedures to be used in
such situations."
Along with other requirements, 1 the court said that the Government
must show affirmatively "that the grand jury process is not being
abused,"' 2 and held it to be such an abuse for the Government "to im-
pose on [the grand jury] . . . investigative work that can be and hereto-
fore has been, successfully accomplished by the regular investigative
agencies of Government. '5 3 The courts have, for years, made such state-
ments as: "The prosecuting agency may not use for its own purposes the
processes available to the grand jury."5 4  Such injunctions have gen-
erally been made without any means of enforcement. The court of
appeals in Mara gave force to such statements by placing the burden
of showing non-abuse upon the prosecutor.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in an opinion much de-
pended upon by the Supreme Court in their reversals of Dionisio and
Mara, 5 denied the necessity for the requirements set forth by the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in those two cases.56 Several other
courts dealt with situations analagous to those in Dionisio and Mara
prior to the Supreme Court decisions.5 7
50. Id. at 583-84.
51. Supra note 14.
52. 454 F.2d at 585.
53. Id. See supra note 2 for an apparent example of such "regular investiga-
tive" work in the case of Dionisio's co-defendant, Charles Bishop Smith.
54. In re Dymo Industries, Inc., 300 F. Supp. 532, 533 (N.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd
per curiam 418 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 937 (1970).
See also Durbin v. United States, 221 F.2d 520 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
55. See 410 U.S. at 768, 769-70, 772.
56. United States v. Doe (Schwartz), 457 F.2d 895, 901 (1972). The court
there held that the fourth amendment does not permit a person subpoenaed by a
grand jury for the sole purpose of furnishing exemplars to either refuse to appear
or to provide the exemplars, regardless of whether the Government is able to
meet a test of reasonableness or not. According to the court, however, the stand-
ards of reasonableness established in Mara v. United States, 454 F.2d 580 (7th Cir.
1971) (see note 14 supra) were met in Doe (Schwartz), so it is questionable whether
the above holding is merely dicta. 457 F.2d at 901.
57. In a case not involving a grand jury, United States v. Harris, 453 F.2d 1317
(8th Cir. 1972), the court held that a demand by law enforcement officers for
handwriting exemplars is subject to the fourth amendment, though under a standard
of less than probable cause. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States
v. McNeal, 463 F.2d 1180, 1181 (5th Cir. 1972) attempted to limit Harris to
cases where exemplars are obtained, without consent, from a defendant who is
illegally detained, although, in the same case, the court seemed to agree with the
result in Dionisio. The defendant, McNeal, argued he was denied fifth and sixth
amendment protections when the district court denied his motion for a subpoena
[Vol. XXII
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The Supreme Court, in reviewing the two cases,'58 agreed with the sec-
ond circuit that there need be no showing of reasonableness by the Gov-
ernment in the procuring of exemplars through grand jury subpoenas. As
has been indicated, the Court partially based its decision on a perceived
distinction between the Davis situation and those in Dionisio and Mara. In
addition to the reasoning already discussed, 9 the Court relied on language
in the Davis opinion in which the Court declined to resolve certain issues
concerning the applicability of the fourth amendment to the taking of exem-
plars. The Davis Court did, indeed, leave open the question whether,
consistently with the fourth and fourteenth amendments, narrowly
circumscribed procedures might be developed for obtaining fingerprints
from people when there was no probable cause to arrest them. The
Dionisio Court interpreted this open question situation to mean that the
Davis Court had not ruled at all upon the applicability of the fourth amend-
ment to the taking of the exemplars.60
It does not appear, however, that the Davis Court was solely con-
cerned with the initial seizure to the exclusion of the second "level"
compelling. a sample of his codefendant's handwriting. The Government, citing
Davis and Dionisio, argued that, without probable cause, they could not compel the
exemplars. The court of appeals agreed with the Government, although it also
held no constitutional violation in the taking of exemplars from the defendant
while incarcerated in a state penal institution. In a subsequent case, United States
v. Nix, 465 F.2d 90, 93 (5th Cir. 1972), however, the court expressed agreement
with the second circuit in their opinion in Doe (Schwartz), 457 F.2d 895 (1972).
The ninth circuit, in United States v. Reynolds, 449 F.2d 1347, 1351 (9th Cir.
1971) denied defendant's contention that Dionisio applied to her situation, and de-
clined to state an opinion as to whether they would follow Dionisio. However,
without mentioning Dionisio, the court, in United States v. Roth, 410 F.2d 1111
(9th Cir. 1972), appeal pending, gave great weight to the fact that handwriting
exemplars were being required of Roth subsequent to indictment, i.e., after a
finding of probable cause, in denying Roth's fourth amendment claims. Id. at
1114-15. The sixth circuit might also be seen as having supported the reasoning in
Dionisio and Mara on the basis of the facts it considered important in United
States v. Ruggirello, 454 F.2d 725 (6th Cir. 1972). The Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, in In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 450
F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1971) recognized the Dionisio situation as one of the "usual ex-
ceptions to the general rule" that there is "no limitation on the character of evi-
dence that may be presented to the grand jury." Id. at 206. Several district
court cases followed the decision in Dionisio and Mara by the seventh circuit:
In re Riccardi, 337 F. Supp. 253, 255-56 (D.N.J. 1972); In re Grand Jury Im-
paneled March 1, 1971, 348 F. Supp. 1001, 1003-04 (N.D. Ohio 1972); United
States v. Bailey, 332 F. Supp. 1351 (N.D. Ill. 1971). Contra United States v.
D'Amato, 340 F. Supp. 1020, 1022 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
58. 442 F.2d at 281.
59. The analogy between the Davis situation and the grand jury subpoena
situation has already been discussed at pages 740-42.
60. 93 S. Ct. at 770.
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of potential fourth amendment violation, that is, the taking of fingerprint
exemplars.6 1 What the Davis Court appeared to be leaving open was
whether "narrowly defined circumstances" might occur in which fourth
amendment requirements could be satisfied without the full establishment
of probable cause.6 2 In other words, the Court in Davis declined to de-
cide whether, in some cases, the standard might be less than that of
probable cause rather than whether the fourth amendment applied to ex-
emplar situations at all. 63  This interpretation seems to be bolstered by
the concurring and dissenting opinions in the Davis case. Both Justice
Harlan, in his concurring opinion, 64 and Justice Stewart, in his dissenting
opinion,66 object to the majority's view of the case, not on their con-
demnation of the initial seizure, but rather on the extension of fourth
amendment protections to the taking of fingerprint exemplars.6 6 The
dissenting opinions by Justices Douglas and Marshall in Dionisio and
Mara also indicate that the Davis case decided the fourth amendment
significance of the taking of the fingerprint samples.67
The Court does not rest its decision solely, however, upon the distinction
between Davis and the present cases. It relies heavily upon the tradi-
tional leeway given to the grand jury by the courts as a result of its "his-
toric role." 68  In order to properly analyze this reasoning, it is necessary
to examine the functions of the grand jury as courts have perceived
them to be, as they actually were in history, and as they exist today.
Although there is some difference of opinion among historians,6 9 the
61. See note 24 supra.
62. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 453 F.2d 1317, 1320 (8th Cir. 1972).
63. See note 24 supra.
64. 394 U.S. at 728 (Harlan, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 730 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
66. In fact, Justice Stewart, who wrote the majority opinions in Dionisio and
Mara, states explicitly, in his Davis dissent, that he does not "disagree with the
Court's conclusion that the petitioner was arrested and detained without probable
cause. But it does not follow that his fingerprints were inadmissible at the trial."
394 U.S. at 730. Justice Stewart then devotes the rest of his opinion to the char-
acteristics of fingerprints as evidence. It does not appear from this opinion that
Justice Stewart saw any difference between the Court's view of the initial seizure
and his own. Thus any difference must have been in terms of the second "level"
of "potential Fourth Amendment violation" (see note 31 supra), i.e., the taking of
the exemplars.
67. 93 S. Ct. at 777, 778. (Douglas, J., dissenting). But see 93 S. Ct. at 781,
785 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
68. United States v. Dionisio, 93 S. Ct. at 773.
69. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MArrLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE
TIME OF EDWARD I at 642 (2d ed. 1903) (hereinafter cited as POLLOCK & MAT-
grand jury is generally thought to have had its origins in the Assizes of
Clarendon in 1166.70 Originally, the sole function of the grand jury was
to bring offenders against the law to the attention of the king, the much
praised "protective" role of the grand jury coming about, if at all, at a
much later date. 71
Whatever its original role, it is asserted by the defenders of the grand
jury that, by the seventeenth century, it had become a protector of indi-
vidual rights, through its ability and willingness to refuse to indict in
cases of government oppression or unfounded prosecution. 72 The turn-
ing point is often cited as the Earl of Shaftesbury's Case,73 in which a Lon-
don grand jury refused to indict the Earl74 on charges of treason brought
by the king's counsel in the highly political late 17th century. There is
historical evidence, not only that the Earl may well have been guilty of
the charges, but that the grand jurors took their action more out of re-
ligious and political sympathy with the Earl,7 5 than in adherence to any
principle of "standing between the accuser and the accused." '76
Furthermore, in an exhaustive and enlightening study of this and other
political cases involving grand juries throughout Anglo-American his-
LAND); T. PLUNKETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 103, n.2 (2d ed.
1936); Note, Criminal Procedure-People v. Sears-The Grand Jury, 22 DEPAUL
L. REv. 260, 265 (1972). Shakespeare, apparently speaking symbolically, had one
of his characters remark that "Judgement and Reason" had been "Grand-jurymen
since before Noah was a sailor." Twelfth Night or What You Will, Act II1,
scene ii.
70. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 69; 1 W. HOLDSwoRTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 147-48 (1903); 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *351. Black-
stone felt it to be an improvement over trial by battle, which it was established as
an alternative to. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *341. See also POLLOCK &
MAITLAND, supra note 69, at 603.
71. Schwartz, Demythologizing the Historic Role of the Grand Jury, 10 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 701, 709-10 (1972); R. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE'S PANEL: THE
GRAND JURY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1634-1941 at 2 (1963); POLLOCK & MAITLAND,
supra note 69, at 642.
72. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962); People v. Minet, 296 N.Y.
315, 323, 73 N.E.2d 529, 532 (1947). See 4 A.L.R.2d 386, 391.
73. 8 How. St. Tr. 759 (1681).
74. Id. at 821. The grand jurors signified this refusal by writing "ignoramus"
across the face of the bill presented to them.
75. 1 T. MACAULAY, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE ACCESSION OF JAMES
II at 244 (International Book Co., New York, n.d.); G.E. AYLMER, A SHORT
HISTORY OF 17TH CENTURY ENGLAND, 1603-1689 at 207 (1963); 2 W. CHURCHILL,
A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 375 (1956); G. EDWARDS, THE
GRAND JURY 29 (1906); Kuh, The Grand Jury "Presentment": Foul Blow or Fair
Play, 55 COL. L. REv. 1103, 1108 (1955); Schwartz, supra note 71 at 718-19.
76. 370 U.S. at 390.
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tory,77 Professor Helene E. Schwartz concluded that the grand jury has,
in the face of political pressures, more often sided with the prosecutor
than the accused. Several other aspects of common law grand jury his-
tory appear to have escaped the attention of many American courts.
One is that the investigative function of the grand jury was far more lim-
ited than it is today.78  Another aspect is that prosecutors were not al-
ways allowed in grand jury proceedings. 79  It is unclear whether these
developments occurred separately or simultaneously, but the expansion
of the investigative powers of the grand jury and the presence and
participation of the prosecuting attorney in its proceedings are central to
the issues in Dionisio and Mara. Therefore a brief examination of the
manner in which the courts have dealt with these two expanding con-
cepts is appropriate.
The requirement of indictment or presentment by a grand jury in cases
of "[c]apital, or otherwise infamous crime . . ... 0 was included in the
Bill of Rights on the basis of its supposed protective function, rather than
any other role it might serve.81  The implications of this distinction
77. Schwartz, supra note 71. As to the general tendency of grand jurors to
side with the prosecutor, even in the absence of political pressures, see Antell,
The Modern Grand Jury: Benighted Supergovernment, 51 A.B.A. J. 153 (1965).
78. The mandate given to the grand jury to act on "tips, rumors, evidence
proffered by the prosecutor, or [their own] personal knowledge" (Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 701 (1972)), in investigating crime, did not apparently ob-
tain to the same degree in prior centuries. I J. CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE
ON CRIMINAL LAW 318 (5th Am. ed. 1847). See also L. LEvY, ORIGINS OF THE
FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 372 (1968) and
his discussion of Lord John Somers' THE SECURITY OF ENGLISHMEN'S LIVES.
79. In discussing the trial of Stephen Colledge, a compatriot of the Earl of
Shaftesbury's, Sir John Hawles commented upon the presence of the king's counsel
in these cases: "I know not how long the practice in that matter of admitting
counsel to a grand jury hath been; I am sure it is a very unjustifiable and unsuf-
ferable one. If the Grand-jury have a doubt in point of law, they ought to have
recourse to the court, and that publicly, and not privately, and not rely upon the
private opinion of counsel, especially of the king's counsel, who are, or at least
behave themselves as if they were parties." Remarks on Colledge's Trial by Sir
John Hawles, Solicitor-General in the Reign of King William the Third, 8 How. St.
Tr. 723, 724 (1681). See also Id. at 771 for a more forceful statement by the
foreman of the Sha/tesbury grand jury.
80. U.S. CONST., AMEND. V.
81. United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 186 (1965) (Wisdom, J., concurring
specially), cert. denied, Cox v. Hauberg, 381 U.S. 935 (1965). See 2 B. SCHWARTZ,
THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1971) where the author states
that the grand jury requirement had, as its direct source, the Massachusetts Ratifying
Convention of 1788. Id. at 675-76. A Mr. Holmes, speaking at that convention,
gives evidence to the fact that the concern over the exclusion of a grand jury re-
quirement from the Constitution was solely based on the expected protective role
it might serve as a check on the prosecutor. Id. at 690. But see Goodell, Where
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were well stated by Judge Wisdom in his concurring opinion in United
States v. Cox:
Because recognition of the grand jury's shield-like function is lodged in the Bill
of Rights, the bedrock of basic rights, it is fair to say that national policy favors
a liberal construction of the power of the grand jury to protect the individual
against official tyranny. No such policy favors the grand jury in its accusatorial
role.8 2
Judge Wisdom is essentially making a distinction which is seldom recog-
nized, that is, that it was not the grand jury as an institution nor as it
served in its accusatory or investigative roles that was recognized by the
Founding Fathers as an essential right of the people, but solely the pro-
tective function which it is professed to perform.83
Based on this reasoning, one would expect to find courts granting free
rein to the grand jury whenever it was acting to protect the individual
from the prosecutor, and skeptically scrutinizing its actions whenever it
acted as an investigator itself. This apparent institutional schizophrenia,
which has been referred to as the performance of a dual function of
"shield" and "sword, "84 should, one would think, have been carefully
delineated by the courts since the effect of one, upon constitutional rights,
is so entirely different than the effect of the other. The grand jury as
investigator has far more in common with the policeman or the prosecu-
tor than it does with the grand jury as protector.8 5
Did The Grand Jury Go?, 246 HARPER'S 14, 16 (May 1973) where former Sena-
tor Goodell notes that Thomas Jefferson felt, by 1791, the grand jury to have been
transformed by the Federalists into a "political engine" which jeopardized first
amendment freedoms.
82. 342 F.2d at 190 (emphasis added).
83. Yet even this protective role has not been considered by the Supreme
Court to be essential enough to due process, coexisting with systems of bringing
charges by information through preliminary hearings, to incorporate the fifth
amendment grand jury requirement to apply to the states. Hurtado v. California,
110 U.S. 516 (1884). This decision received a more recent approval in Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 4, n.2 (1964). See also Morford v. Hocker, 394 F.2d 169, 170
(9th Cir. 1968) for other cases reaffirming Hurtado; and Rowan v. State, 30
Wis. 129, 149 (1872) which came to same conclusion twelve years before
Hurtado.
84. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 102 N.J. Super. 325, 340, 246 A.2d 35, 43 (Sup.
Ct. 1968) a/I'd 55 N.J. 476, 262 A.2d 868 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949
(1970).
85. See, e.g., People ex rel. District Attorney v. District Court, Second Dis-
trict, 75 Colo. 412, 414, 225 P. 829 (1924) (per curiam); United States v. Cleary,
265 F.2d 459, 461 (2d Cir. 1959); Younger, The Grand Jury Under Attack, 46 J.
CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 214, 224 (1955); Blakey, Aspects of the Evidence Gathering
Process in Organized Crime Cases: A Preliminary Analysis, app. C in TASK FORCE
ON ORGANIZED CRIME, THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME 80,
83-84 (1967).
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Instead, it is found, the courts have seldom differentiated between the
grand jury as investigator and as protector, granting to both functions the
constitutional stature which only the latter deserves.8 6  Although no
court would consider speaking of a police investigation as a constitutional
right of the citizen being investigated, the investigative power of the
grand jury has, through its connection with the protective function, al-
most been elevated to such a position, even when the protective function is
not in consideration. Although not granting it constitutional stature, one
judge remarked:
The inquisitorial power of the grand jury is the most valuable function which it
possesses today and, far more than any supposed protection which it gives to the
accused, justifies its survival as an institution. As an engine of discovery against
organized and far-reaching crime, it has no counterpart. Policy emphatically for-
bids that there should be any curtailment of it except in the clearest cases.8 7
Few courts have been as honest about their desire for a weapon against
criminal activity unfettered by such technicalities as constitutional rights.
The justification for the broad investigatory power granted the grand
jury has, therefore, not been limited to the esteem the investigating grand
jury has received through association with the protecting grand jury.
Another method of justification has been to divorce the grand jury from
the due process required of other investigative bodies by defining the role
of the grand jury as other than prosecutorial in nature. These efforts
have resulted in utter confusion as to where the grand jury fits into the
scheme of government.
The grand jury has, at various times, been defined by courts as "not an
agency of the district attorney general or of the court but . . . an agency
of the government" 88 and therefore "independent" 8 9 as well as "part of
the investigatory process and not the prosecution . . ."90 and, though
86. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956); United States v. Harte-
Hanks Newspapers, 254 F.2d 366, 369-70 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 357 U.S.
938 (1958).
87. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 4 F. Supp. 283, 284 (E.D. Pa. 1933), quoted
in United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d at 175 (1965) (Rives, Gewin & Bell, JJ., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
88. Parton v. State, 455 S.W.2d 645, 647 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. 1970).
89. State v. Marks, 464 S.W.2d 326, 328 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. 1970), cert.
denied, 464 S.W.2d 326 (Tenn. Sup. Ct. 1971).
90. People v. Waters, 27 N.Y.2d 553, 556, 313 N.Y.S.2d 124, 125, 261 N.E.2d
265, 266 (1970) (per curiam). See also People v. lanniello, 21 N.Y.2d 418, 424,
288 N.Y.S.2d 462, 467, 235 N.E.2d 439, 443 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 827
(1968); People v. Cavalieri, 36 A.D.2d 284, 288, 320 N.Y.S.2d 390, 394 (1971)
(Capozzoli, J., dissenting); aff'd, 29 N.Y.2d 762, 276 N.E.2d 624, cert. denied,
Cavalieri v. New York, 406 U.S. 962 (1972); People v. Selikoff, 66 Misc. 2d 618,
CASE NOTES
part of the judicial process, one court held, the grand jury does not per-
form "a judicial function in the constitutional sense." 9 1 It may have been
necessary for courts to make this latter distinction in order to keep the
strict procedures applicable to the judiciary from applying to grand jury
proceedings. One federal court avoided this problem by stating that:
While the grand jury is, in a sense, a part of our court system, when exercising
its traditional functions it possesses an independence which is unique. Its author-
ity is derived from none of the three basic divisions of our government, but rather
from the people themselves. 9 2
A federal district court recently held that the grand jury does not perform
a judicial function and for that reason its proceedings need not be adver-
sary. 93 Six pages later, in the same opinion, the court held it to be part
of the judicial branch and thus subject to the separation of powers.9 4
It is clear, therefore, that the courts are not in complete agreement as to
what the grand jury is. Apparently reacting to the confusion, Moore's
Federal Practice stated: "When technical and theoretical distinctions are
put aside, the true nature of the grand jury emerges-i.e., it is 'basi-
cally . . . a law enforcement agency.'-95 This, however, is not more
conclusive than any of the above attempts at categorization. There is a
further possibility of what part the grand jury may play in the criminal
justice system. Some courts have attempted to limit the concept of the
grand jury to that of an accusing body and, in so doing, again deny
the need for those procedural safeguards which would be necessary at
trial. 96 Were the grand jury solely an accusatory body, however, the
two cases which are the subject of this note, Dionisio and Mara, would
never have taken place, since, in Anglo-American law, a formal accusing
623-24, 322 N.Y.S.2d 103, 108 (Cty. Ct. 1971). But see People v. Cohen, 12
Cal. App. 3d 298, 311, 90 Cal. Rptr. 612, 619-20 (1970).
91. State v. Lehtola, 55 Wis. 2d 494, 497, 198 N.W.2d 354, 356 (1972).
92. In re April 1956 Term Grand Jury, 239 F.2d 263, 269 (7th Cir. 1956).
One might well ask, in light of the preceding discussion, what this court consid-
ered the grand jury's traditional functions to be. See also In re Dymo Industries,
Inc., 300 F. Supp. at 533; In re William H. Pflaumer & Sons, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 464
(E.D. Pa. 1971); United States v. Bailey, 332 F. Supp. 1351, 1353 (N.D. Ill.
1971).
93. Hammond v. Brown, 323 F. Supp. 326, 338 (N.D. Ohio 1971), al'd per
curiam, 450 F.2d 480 (6th Cir. 1971).
94. Id. at 344-45.
95. 8 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 6.02(1)(b) at 6-11 (1972), quoting
from United States v. Cleary, 265 F.2d 459, 460 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
360 U.S. 936 (1959).
96. United States v. Scully, 225 F.2d 113, 116 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 897 (1955); United States v. Cleary, 265 F.2d at 460.
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body, i.e., one which determines whether the accusations brought are jus-
tified, is a passive and impartial body, not an investigative one.9 7
If the grand jury is a protective body, it is difficult to understand
why an accused or potentially accused would not, before the grand jury,
have the benefit of counsel, confrontation of the witnesses against him, the
right to inspect the minutes of the proceedings and an opportunity to re-
but the prosecutor's evidence against him. It would appear that such
rights could only assist a grand jury in their function as a check upon the
prosecutor.98 If the grand jury is an accusatory body, there is little rea-
son that the rights enumerated above should be denied to the accused
and, additionally, it is an anachronism in modern urban society which has
a parallel system of preliminary hearings.9 9 If the grand jury is an in-
vestigative body, there is no reason that it should be viewed differently
than other investigative bodies in terms of constitutional limitations. 100
One of the main issues in the present cases involves the potentiality
for abusive use of the subpoena power by either an investigating grand
jury or a prosecutor using the grand jury for his own purposes, resulting
in the deprivation of constitutional rights. One author has stated that,
"[o]utside the grand jury context, Congress has withheld from federal
prosecutors and FBI agents the power to compel testimony during their
investigations," noting that cases such as Miranda v. Arizona'0 ' would
97. Cf. courts in preliminary hearings.
98. Furthermore, the argument that the accused's constitutional claims can be
adequately handled at trial, and that there is, therefore, no need for protection at
the grand jury stage, seems to be belied by the Supreme Court's holdings, in several
cases, that a district court has jurisdiction, prior to indictment, to determine con-
stitutional claims. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 355
(1931); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 474 (1921); Perlman v. United States,
247 U.S. 7, 13 (1918). See also Austin v. United States, 297 F.2d 356, 358
(4th Cir. 1961). These holdings would be meaningless if, having gained access to
the courts, the petitioner was informed that his claims were premature.
99. One author, in discussing why England abolished the grand jury in 1933,
noted that, aside from the economic expense, the more important reason was the
establishment, in 1848, of preliminary hearings: "The satisfactory character of
these examinations did away with the usefulness of the grand jury as a check on
groundless prosecutions." Elliff, Notes on the Abolition of the English Grand
Jury, 2 J. AM. INST. CRiM. L. & CraM. 3, 4 (1938). See also F. REMINGTON
ET AL., CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION: MATERIALS AND CASES 515 (1969) for a
description of how the parallel existence of both grand juries and preliminary
hearings work for the prosecutor and against the accused.
100. "The Bill of Rights is applicable to investigations as to all forms of gov-
ernmental action. Witnesses cannot be compelled to give evidence against them-
selves. They cannot be subjected to unreasonable search and seizure." Watkins
v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).
101. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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limit Congress in such a grant. 10 2 Although much question has arisen over
methods which are used by courts to prevent the prosecutor from abusing
the grand jury subpoena power; 10 3 a more basic question is whether the
grand jury should have the subpoena power at all. 10 4
In similar "subpoena power" situations, the Court has looked to the
function or purpose of the body under question. In his concurring opinion
in Hannah v. Larche, °5 Justice Frankfurter discussed the guidelines which
have been set down by the Court in prior cases for determining whether a
grant of the subpoena power to a particular body was violative of con-
stitutional rights. In analyzing In re Groban,10 6 in which the Court had
affirmed the giving of the power of subpoena to a fire marshall investi-
gating the causes of a fire, Justice Frankfurter stated that:
The guiding consideration was that, although suspects might be discovered, the
essential purpose of the Fire Marshall's inquiry was not to adjudicate individual
responsibility for the fire but to pursue a legislative policy of fire prevention
through the discovery of the origin of fires.' 0 7
The grand jury may, indeed, begin its investigation without specific
persons in mind and, as in Groban, may be merely attempting to ascertain
the "causes" of a criminal situation. There can be little doubt, how-
102. Comment, Federal Grand Jury Investigation of Political Dissidents, 7
HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-Cv. LIB. L. REV. 432, 444 (1972). See Goodell, supra
note 81, at 28 for a discussion of the prosecutor and the grand jury's subpoena
power.
103. See, e.g., United States v. Doe (Ellsberg), 455 F.2d 1270, 1274-75 (1st
Cir. 1972) for a discussion of the difficulties of policing grand jury proceedings.
The court also commented that the situation in Mara v. United States, 454 F.2d 580
(7th Cir. 1971) presented a greater feasibility of remedy than in the case before it.
104. In Cudahy Packing Co. Ltd. v. Holland, 315 U.S. 357, 363 (1942), the
Court stated that the subpoena power "is a power capable of oppressive use, es-
pecially when it may be indiscriminately delegated and . . . is not returnable be-
fore a judicial officer." See supra notes 35 through 37 and accompanying text as
to the potentiality for indiscriminate delegation of the court's control over the
grand jury subpoena power.
105. 363 U.S. 420, 486 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
106. 352 U.S. 330 (1957).
107. 363 U.S. at 491 (emphasis added). Justice Frankfurter also discussed
Anonymous Nos. 6 & 7 v. Baker, 360 U.S. 287 (1959), and the giving of the sub-
poena power to a state judicial inquiry into the local bar and, significant to the
present analysis, he noted that, though "the inquiry could serve as a groundwork
for the prosecution of witnesses before it, the Court applied Groban because the
inquiry was a general one and appellants were before it not as potential accused,
but 'solely as witnesses.'" Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. at 491 (emphasis added). As
to the unconstitutionality of non-judicial bodies possessing the subpoena power
when dealing with "putative defendants," see United States v. Minker, 350 U.S.
179 (1956) as well as the court of appeals decision in that case, 217 F.2d 350,
352-53 (3d Cir. 1955).
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ever, that the end result of most investigating grand juries is to deter-
mine whether there is probable cause for "the prosecution of some one or
more parties for violation of the law.' u0 8 The goal of the grand jury in
its investigative role is not, essentially, to inquire into "causes," but to
focus on and indict violators of the law. On the critieria for the granting
of the subpoena power to investigative bodies as outlined by the Court, it
is difficult to understand the existence of the power in the hands of the
grand jurors.
The Court, in Dionisio and Mara, refused to impose on the grand jury
the same standards imposed on other investigative bodies in deference to
its "historic role."'109  In subpoenaing the witnesses solely for the pur-
pose of procuring exemplars, it is clear that the grand jury was not
serving in its protective role. 110  Nor were these grand juries serving
their accusatory function, unless that traditional concept of passiveness
and impartiality can be so expanded as to include compelling a person
to submit evidence upon which he can be accused. If anything, the
action taken by the grand juries, in the Dionisio and Mara cases, falls
within their investigative role. This again raises the question of the pro-
priety of an investigating grand jury having the power to subpoena in the
first place. This question arises even assuming that it was the grand
jury, and not the Government, which was compelling the exemplars. There
is, however, evidence to the contrary. Though the Court in Dionisio speaks
of the grand jury as " 'acting independently of either prosecuting attor-
ney or judge,' "I" the information upon which the exemplars were sought
was procured by prosecutorial or law enforcement agency investigation
rather than independent investigation by the grand jury itself.112 Further-
more, in both cases, the witnesses were to submit the exemplars not to
the grand jury, but to government agents outside the grand jury room."13
108. Application of Texas Co., 27 F. Supp. 847, 851 (E.D. II1. 1939) (empha-
sis added). The court also noted generally the difficulty in deciding grand jury
questions.
109. 93 S. Ct. at 773.
110. It would be quite different to assert this proposition in light of the fact that
the two defendants here involved felt so strongly that their rights were jeopardized
by having to submit the exemplars that they knowingly placed themselves in con-
tempt of court and appealed all the way to the Supreme Court in order to
avoid submitting them.
111. 93S. Ct. at773.
112. In Dionisio, the information was voice recordings of telephone conver-
sations intercepted by the FBI. 442 F.2d at 278. In Mara, the information was,
according to the court of appeals, solely "the results the Government derived from
its own investigation. ... 454 F.2d at 583.
113. 442 F.2d at 278; 454 F.2d at 582. In Mara, the grand jury's "desig-
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Thus, in the very cases in which the fourth amendment issues of procur-
ing exemplars through grand jury subpoena were decided, there is evi-
dence that the grand jury was not acting independently, but rather as
an extra arm of the prosecutor. At the very best, even if independent of
the prosecutor in temperament, they necessarily depended almost exclu-
sively upon the prosecutor-they are supposed to act as a watch-dog-
for their investigative work as regards the subpoenaed witnesses.'
1 4
In most contexts, the prosecutor is expected to present only one side of
a legal controversy. 115 In the grand jury context, he is the sole attorney
nated agent" was an FBI agent. Brief for Witness-Appellant, In re Mara, 454
F.2d 580 (1971). See Durbin v. United States, 221 F.2d 520 (D.C. Cir. 1954)
in which the United States Attorney had never taken Durbin before the grand
jury though he had been summoned by grand jury subpoena, but always to his
own office, where Durbin was questioned by the Attorney and federal agents:
"IT]he United State's Attorney's office [is not] a proper substitute for the grandjury room and ...the use of a grand jury subpoena, a process of the District
Court, as a compulsory administrative process of the United States Attorney's office
[is not proper]." Id. at 522.
114. See United States v. United States District Court of West Virginia, 238
F.2d 713, 720-21 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, Valley Bell Dairy Co. v. United
States, 352 U.S. 981 (1957). Additionally, in speaking of the presence of unau-
thorized persons in the grand jury room and the reason New York courts do not
require a person to show influence in such a case before an indictment will be set
aside, a New York court of appeals noted, in People v. Minet, 296 N.Y. 315, 322,
73 N.E.2d 529, 532 (1947) that "[a] change in expression, a pressure on the hand
or a warning glance would not be shown upon the minutes, but might well influence,
suppress or alter testimony to the prejudice of the defendant." The unauthorized
person in this case was the sister of a witness, whom the witness had brought along
for comfort because she was "afraid and nervous." One might ask whether the
active and pervasive role played by the prosecutor in presenting a case to the grand
jury would be any less prejudicial to the defendant than the passive and temporary
influence of the witness' sister in Minet.
115. Then Chief Judge Warren Burger, in a case dealing with the Executive's
discretion in initiating criminal proceedings, Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d
479, 481 (D.C. Cir. 1967), described at length the dual role of the United States
Attorney as both officer of the court and "agent and attorney for a client."
In the former role, the chief judge said, he is responsible to the court, as is any
other attorney, "for the manner of his conduct of a case, i.e., his demeanor, deport-
ment and ethical conduct ...... See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CANON OF JUDIcIAL ETHics (1969). As to the
second capacity, he noted that: "As agent and attorney for the Executive, he is
responsible to his principal and the courts have no power over the exercise of his
discretion or his motives as they relate to the execution of his duty within the
framework of his employment." Id. at 481. As to the potentiality for prosecutorial
abuse, see Antell, The Modern Grand Jury: Benighted Supergovernment, 51
A.B.A.J. 153 (1965); Goodell, supra note 81. As to the lack of judicial control
over the prosecuter's decision to prosecute, see Peek v. Mitchell, 419 F.2d 575
(6th Cir. 1970); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d at 171-72; Jacklovich v. Inter-
lake, Inc., 458 F.2d 923, 925, n.6 (1972). But see Connecticut Action Now,
Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co., 457 F.2d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1972).
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allowed in the proceedings. 116 As an indication of the potentiality for
abuse of the grand jury process in such a situation, one might consider
what would occur if a defense-oriented attorney was the only attorney
allowed in the grand jury room and there was no other means by which
the prosecutor might bring certain charges. There is no more reason to
expect that a prosecutor would be any more zealous in protecting the
rights of defendants than a defense-oriented attorney would be of the
prosecutor's "rights" in the same situation." 7
The Supreme Court, in ruling on Dionisio and Mara, might have been
more cautious about the potentiality for prosecutorial abuse of the grand
jury subpoena power. Since the subpoenas involved here could only
have issued from a grand jury which was performing its investigative
function, the question of judicial review need not have involved any
analysis different than the Court has used in dealing with other investiga-
tive agencies. The likely effect of these decisions was accurately, if not
intentionally, predicted in United States v. Bailey." 8 The court there
warned that:
Dionisio is a logical extension of Davis. We believe it is also a necessary extension
if Davis is not to become substantially meaningless .... If Dionisio is not valid,
all that needs to be done to avoid the interdictions of Davis is to empanel a grand
jury and have it round up all the possible suspects and compel each of them to
provide the appropriate exemplars.'l1
The Bailey court was suggesting that the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, by their decisions in Dionisio and Mara, had eliminated a loop-
116. See, e.g., United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283, 306 (N.D. Cal. 1952);
United States ex rel. Cooper v. Reincke, 333 F.2d 608, 611 (2d Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 909 (1964); Case v. State, 220 So. 2d 289 (Miss. 1969);
State v. Stallings, 25 Conn. Sup. 386, 206 A.2d 277, 278-79 (1964); People v.
District Court of the Second Judicial District, 75 Colo. 412, 414, 225 P. 829
(1924) in which the grand jury attempted unsuccessfully to exclude the prosecutor
from the proceedings. The court held that, by state statute, the prosecutor not
only had the right, but the duty, to attend and assist and said that: "The presence
of the prosecuting officer tends to expediate the work of the grand jury, and the
knowledge of the facts there obtained is of advantage to him in the preparation
and trial of the indictments returned." In terms of expediating the work of the
grand jury, and related also to the second reason given by the court for the pres-
ence of the prosecutor, it is worth noting that Blackstone, in his day, defended the
grand jury against its detractors in saying that "[h]owever convenient [methods
other than grand and petit juries] may appear at first, (as doubtless all arbitrary
powers, well executed, are the most convenient) yet again let it be remembered,
that delays, and little inconveniences in the forms of justice, are the price that all
free nations must pay for their liberty in more substantial matters." 4 W. BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES *344.
117. Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d at 481.
118. 332F. Supp. 1351 (N.D. III. 1971).
119. Id. at 1354.
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hole by which governmental officials could have obtained, without any
showing at all, any evidence legally classified as "non-testimonial," which,
by the Supreme Court's prior pronouncements, it could not have obtained
by any other means, absent a showing of reasonableness.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit realized that the time is
long past when the grand jury served in its protective role and viewed
it as courts have, for years, viewed other investigative bodies-skepti-
cally and with an eye open for abuse. The Supreme Court has not yet
come to that realization.
Richard J. Moriarty

